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The raison d’être for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and its more recent 
Broad Based version is to achieve racial economic equality. This paper evaluates 
how narrowly defined BEE – which is limited to the conferring of ownership, 
management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic resources to 
previously disadvantaged individuals – measures up against Rawls’s theory of 
distributive justice. The paper argues that the policy of BEE’s ostensible 
implementation failures are a consequence of inherent problems in the 
conception of this policy – the conflation of individuals, who are real personalities 
with moral responsibilities, and the group, which is an abstract entity from a moral 
point of view.  The paper further argues that the desired goals of directly 
addressing the economy’s skewed racial profile and the requisite changes in 
intra- and inter-firm relational patterns of capital and control are not adequately 
served by the BEE policy as currently conceived.  It argues that the levels and 
patterns of inequality that are exacerbated by this policy are not biased towards 
the advantage of the poorest of the poor as envisaged in Rawls’s principles of 
distributive justice. Arguments in favour of the current strategy of BEE are 
evaluated, but the general gist of the argument is that the policy as currently 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
BEE is defined by the Black Economic Empowerment Commission as ‘an 
integrated policy … which aims to redress past imbalances by transferring and 
conferring ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and 
economic resources to the majority of its citizens and ensure broader 
participation of black people in the economy in order to achieve sustainable 
development and prosperity1. As is often the case in economics and philosophy, 
the seemingly straightforward definition of Black Economic Empowerment belies 
its intricate nature. Presently, debates and questions are raised over the validity, 
scope and future of BEE, and the implications of these debates both in practical 
and conceptual terms, are profound and far-reaching.  
From the onset, I accept BEE as a part of a suite of policies founded on a 
constitutional basis that are collectively designed to address the legacy of past 
injustices. The broader definition of this policy – Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) – is a multi-pronged strategy aimed at transforming all 
the different levels of the economy from within the different organisations and 
sectors within existing economic structures. This policy is aimed at increasing the 
number of black people who:  
(a) manage and control enterprises and productive assets 
(b) benefit through communal ownership and management of 
productive assets through co-operatives and other collective 
enterprises 
(c) are affirmed through human resource and skills development 
(d) represent all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce in an equitable manner 
(e) benefit through preferential procurement 
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(f) invest in enterprises that are owned or managed by black 
people. 
While acknowledging the comprehensive and potentially far-reaching implications 
of BBBEE, the focus of this paper is limited to the narrower definition of BEE, 
namely ownership and control. 
I justify this narrow focus on two accounts: that ownership and control is the 
cornerstone of BEE2 and that it is a potential instrument for dealing with structural 
issues that impede economic growth and racial access3. 
Given the South African government’s goal of achieving racial economic equality, 
narrowly defined BEE seems the most appropriate to evaluate, as it is a policy 
designed to redistribute the ownership and control of means of production. This 
would correct historical economic imbalances to enable all communities to 
participate in and contribute to all aspects of economic activity in South Africa. 
In the context of effectively dealing with past economic inequalities, I further 
make the assumption that narrowly defined BEE has the potential to dislodge the 
‘macroculture’ – a ‘system of widely shared assumptions and values …that guide 
the actions and create typical behavioural patterns.’4 These are what Woolsey-
Biggart and Guillen call the broad social ‘organisational logics’ that are ‘taken for 
granted organisational arrangements that both prompt and constrain economic 
actors …and help to determine which social roles and strategies are conceivable, 
efficacious, and legitimate’5. Put differently, this policy seeks to change 
institutionalised behavioural patterns within and between firms. 
In this research paper, I assess BEE in the light of John Rawls’s theory of 
distributive justice. Rawls’s theory is not defended; rather it forms the theoretical 
framework against which the success and moral credentials of BEE can be 
evaluated. The cardinal objective of this report is not directed at the failures or 
successes of the implementation of this policy; rather, it is an evaluation at the 
level of principle and fundamental tenets of this policy. 
Before proceeding with the outline, it is necessary to elucidate the reasons for 
choosing Rawls’s distributive justice above compensatory justice theories, 
despite the historical context of the government’s redistributive policies. 
3 
 
The classical understanding of compensatory justice, which is ‘corrective justice 
in involuntary exchanges such as theft, assault or murder’6does seem to justify an 
argument for compensatory justice. In addition, South Africa’s historical context – 
legislatively enforced dispossession that resulted in gross inequalities – would 
ordinarily lead one to think that a compensatory theory of justice is the most 
suitable framework to assess BEE.  
However, the correction of past injustices would require a mechanism of directly 
redistributing and allocating resources to the previously disadvantaged 
individuals (PDIs) from those who were previously advantaged by the economic 
system. The untenable calculus of evaluating and attributing appropriate and 
timely exchanges to address a strong backward-looking compensatory justice 
argument does not seem feasible. Given the movements of ownership and 
control over the last decade, one would have situations where PDIs who are 
beneficiaries of current legislation would have to compensate other PDIs by virtue 
of being current owners of means of production. Thus, the strong compensatory 
justice argument is fatally entangled in an unsustainable inter-generational 
attribution analysis, which renders distributive justice a better framework: while it 
addresses past injustices, it is forward looking in its implementation. In choosing 
distributive justice over compensatory justice, I am guided by the Dictionary of 
Philosophy’s definition of distributive justice as ‘the right way of allocating benefits 
and burdens’7. 
Another distributive argument is the libertarian argument as espoused by Robert 
Nozick in his Entitlement Theory, as summarised by Julian Lamont: ‘A distribution 
is just if everyone is entitled to the holding they possess under the distribution’8. 
He further refers to principles of justice in transfer and the principle of justice in 
acquisition. According to Nozick, ‘An acquisition is just if and only if the position of 
others after the acquisition is no worse than was when the acquisition was 
unowned or ‘held in common’9. 
While his theory carries some appeal in that the principle of transfer is meant to 
specify fair contracts, the principle of acquisition is more complex in that it 
involves the establishment of exclusive property rights. 
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Given the complexity of the South African history of dispossession and the 
intractable complexity of establishing legitimate ownership as demonstrated in 
the Truth and Reconciliation process, I concluded that this distributive justice 
theory cannot be applied to BEE. 
There seems to be a conscious decision by the South African government to 
adopt a forward-looking process of redistribution in the process of writing the 
constitution and the subsequent enactment of the current forward-looking suite of 
BBBEE policies. In this essay, it is argued that narrowly defined BEE is chief in 
this suite of policies.   
Thomas Pogge’s assertion that, ‘A morally deeply-tarnished history must not be 
allowed to result in radical inequality’10, seems sound advice in the context of 
South Africa’s economic transformation. 
While I have chosen distributive justice as the framework to analyse BEE, this 
essay is by no means the last word in terms of the systematic analysis of the 
success and moral claims of BEE. I proceed with an understanding that while 
cogent arguments could be raised in support of compensatory justice or 
‘commutative justice’11 as most appropriate frameworks, Rawlsian distributive 
justice was chosen in the light of my interpretation of the underlying spirit and 
intention of the South African constitution and the concomitant policies that have 
been written to transform South African society. 
In this paper I treat BEE as an intervention that falls within the area of distributive 
justice since it deals with the regulation of how things such as rights, goods 
should be distributed in a given society.  
To evaluate BEE as a justice-related government intervention I utilise the work of 
pre-eminent distributive justice theorist, John Rawls. This provides a concise and 
clearly defined framework that can be systematically applied to BEE issues. I 
conjoin the fundamental tenets of John Rawls’s assertion that the stability of any 
society ‘depends upon the extent to which the members of that society feel that 
they are being treated justly’12 with Kant’s notion of equality: ‘human beings all 
have the same dignity and in virtue of this dignity they deserve to be treated as 
equals. Whenever individuals are treated unequally on the basis of 
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characteristics that are arbitrary and irrelevant, their fundamental human dignity 
has been violated’13. I therefore make the assumption that all notions of justice 
are premised on equality at the level of the individual. I further invoke Dr Jan 
Edward’s description of the general principle of distributive justice: ‘In assignment 
of benefits and burdens, those who are equal in relevant ways should be treated 
equally, those who are unequal in relevant ways should be treated unequally in 
proportion to their inequality’14. 
The provisions of Rawls’s theory of justice allow for certain inequalities that 
enhance the absolute conditions of the poorest of the poor (this issue is dealt with 
elsewhere in this essay). Because of this, I make the assumption that the theory 
does not detract from the egalitarian norms that underpin BEE policy; and I 
assume the implicit egalitarian norms that underpin both the South African 
constitution and BEE as a policy.  
In the following sections, I intend to build arguments that will support the core 
charge of this essay: that BEE is fundamentally flawed because it conflates the 
group with the individual without a mechanism that ensures the protection of 
individuals.  
The fundamental concept of Rawls’s ideal distributive theory is founded on what 
he calls ideal theory. Rawls describes ideal theory as ‘a conception of a perfectly 
just society’15. He believes that ‘the reason for beginning with ideal theory is that 
it provides… the only basis for the systemic grasp of these more pressing 
problems [that we are faced with in everyday life]’16. The fundamentals of 
considering Rawls’s justice as fairness are the equal-liberty principle, fair equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle. These principles only hold under ideal 
conditions of ‘strict compliance’17. 
BEE’s point of departure from ideal theory lies in not focusing on principles of 
justice in the perfectly just society. Rather it is a practical guide to effectively 
move us closer to a more just society. It addresses ‘non-ideal’ real-world 
injustices of the past. As such, it is in the non-ideal theory trajectory since it is 
designed to address economic inequalities induced by apartheid. The preamble 
to the BBBEE Act espouses the notion of achieving a ‘more equitable income 
6 
 
distribution’ and ‘equal opportunity’; this confers to BEE the status of a plausible 
measure for moving us towards a well-ordered society18. 
BEE could further be justified because in a non-ideal world ‘the principles of 
justice are prior to considerations of efficiency’ as opposed to ideal conditions 
where …’all efficient arrangements are declared equally just’19. According to 
Robert Taylor, ‘the goal of non-ideal theory is to create a world in which the ideal 
theory can be applied’20. 
In this paper I argue that the desired goals of directly addressing the economy’s 
skewed racial profile and the requisite changes in organisational relational 
patterns of capital and control are not adequately served by the BEE policy as 
currently conceived. Further, the levels and patterns of inequality that are 
exacerbated by this policy are not biased towards the advantage of the poorest of 
the poor as envisaged in Rawls’s principles of distributive justice. 
In Section 2, I present the aim and ideal conception of BEE as envisaged in 
government legislation. In section 3, I present Rawls’s Theory of Distributive 
Justice as a framework for evaluating the efficacy of BEE. Section 4 presents 
how Rawls’s theory would move South Africa to greater racial equality. Section 5 
deals with objections, replies and counter arguments. Section 6 is the conclusion.  
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Section 2: Aims and ideal conception of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) 
The raison d’être for BEE –  and its more recent Broad Based version – is to 
achieve racial economic equality. This policy seeks to achieve this objective 
through primarily broadening the economic base by unraveling the logjams that 
were artificially created by the previous system. 
In this context, John Friedmann provides a concept of empowerment that is 
relevant to the policy of BEE. He defines empowerment as: 
An alternative development, which places emphasis on the improvement 
in the conditions of life and livelihood of the excluded majority. 
Empowerment is the alternative development because it aims to redress 
the historical process of systematic disempowerment or exclusion of the 
vast majority of people from economic and political power21.  
In Friedmann’s thesis, the long-term goal of empowerment is to transform the 
structures of power and society through the improvement of the very system that 
excludes the vast majority of citizens.  
According to Edigheji, for Friedmann’s ‘process of empowerment to succeed it 
requires a strong and proactive state’22. The role of the state in ensuring and 
monitoring the process of BEE will be addressed elsewhere in this essay.  
While accepting the conceptual framework and the emphasis raised by Edigheji 
in his analysis I do not accept his thesis that the ‘minimalist approach or ‘narrowly 
defined’ BEE as opposed to the ‘maximalist approach’ or BBBEE, necessarily 
lend the black capitalist class to a position of not ‘seeking to transform the 
corporate structure rather become comfortable with it as long as they become 
‘stinking rich’’23. As already stated, the fundamental problem is at the key charge 
of this essay: this is the putative substitution of groups for individuals in building a 
moral system of redistributing and attributing benefits and burdens. This is 
compounded by two additional factors that will be addressed later in this essay. 
These are the pre-eminence of the private sector in developing and dictating the 
magnitude and direction of BEE coupled with the tenuous link of ‘comrades in 
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business’24 who have neither the acumen nor the entrepreneurial foresight to 
influence and adapt their enterprises to the new demands of the economic 
environment. In a sense, the latter challenges reflect the tension that is 
eloquently stated by Friedmann when he posits that, ‘although empowerment is 
centred on people rather than on profits, it faces a profit-driven development as a 
dialectical other’25. 
Professor Themba Sono provides a cogent definition of BEE when he says, ‘BEE 
is a corrective, creative and constructive mechanism for the redistribution of 
justice. It involves the shifting of power – politically, commercially, economically 
and educationally – from the traditional centres to the new demand sectors – the 
black population’26. His definition posits BEE as an enabling mechanism for all 
those who were marginalised by the system of apartheid and also speaks to 
those with entrepreneurial prowess and are capable of conducting their own 
economic endeavours without assistance or interference to be allowed to 
continue. Edigheji sums up the contents of this definition as ‘conceptually placing 
at its core the simultaneous empowerment of the black people as a collective and 
the individual as an entity’27.  
This conceptual framework speaks to the empowerment that conjoins the 
individual and the collective in its process of empowering. The maladies of 
apartheid, which are being redressed with their concomitant racial, gender and 
class inequalities, impact on the individual as well as the collective. According to 
Edigheji’s argument, ‘BEE-related companies should therefore be socially and 
politically rooted with the aim of empowering the community at large by adjoining 
two conflicting but mutually reinforcing interests that are collective (which is 
developmental) and economic interest of the entrepreneur (which is profit 
maximising)’28. 
In this essay, I concur with the preceding argument as long as the individual as 
an entity is not conflated with the collective in the formulation of policies and the 
social contracts that are entered into. At the core of this analysis lies the question 
of values and accepted norms that underpin BEE as a policy.  
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In a recently published collection of essays on empowerment, Xolela Mangcu 
quotes Professor Fukuyama, who illustrates the significant influence of norms 
and values of human sociability on economic activities in the following comment: 
There is scarcely any area of economic activity, from a dry-cleaning 
business to fabricating large-scale integrated circuits that does not require 
the collaboration of human beings. And while people work in organisations 
to satisfy their individual needs, the workplace also draws people out of 
their private lives to a wider social world29. 
Before the dawn of the democratic South Africa, the organising principles and 
policies and norms that governed organisations and institutions were designed to 
exclude the majority of South Africans. This necessitated a new social contract 
that would enable broader participation by all the members of the South African 
society. As Matthew Andrews put it, ‘Racial patterns in South Africa’s economy 
cannot be adjusted without some structural change that challenges the race-
based organising logics that deem it appropriate for whites (and more particularly 
specific groups of whites) to be empowered insiders and other groups 
disempowered outsiders’30. 
However, in the context of this essay, BEE is intended to expose black people to 
the economic substance of ownership and control. As sociologist Roger Southall 
put it, BEE is the ‘increase of black ownership, control and management of state, 
parastatal and private economic activity in the formal sector’31. 
BEE has its roots in the South African constitutional provisions and social 
context. Equality is the bedrock of South Africa’s constitution and policies such as 
BEE are seen as a means to achieve economic equality and not as a deviation 
from the right to equality. 
The notion of economic justice has never been divorced from the ideal of 
substantive equality. The precursor of BEE, the Reconstruction and development 
Programme (RDP), was conceived as  ‘an integrated, coherent socio-economic 
policy framework, which seeks to mobilise all the people and the resources of 
South Africa towards the final eradication of the result of apartheid, the building of 
a pluralistic future’32. ‘The programme (RDP) is a vision for the fundamental 
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transformation of the country. It integrates growth, development, reconstruction, 
redistribution and reconciliation into a unified programme’33.While the tenor of the 
description contains strong political rhetoric, it also specifically addresses issues 
such as ‘racial and gender inequalities in ownership, employment and skills as 
serious weaknesses in the economy’34. It further raises the problematic nature of 
South Africa’s concentrated ownership patterns, which require mechanisms to 
increase participation and the establishment of a more racially inclusive 
economy. 
This policy was refined and culminated in the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. I shall not enumerate the elements of this policy 
here, save to say that it encompasses broader macro-economic elements that 
would enhance growth and economic redistribution in the South African economy 
in order to create a sustainable and economically equitable society in the long 
term. The government sought to establish the basic guiding principles of BEE to 
establish an enabling environment where distributive justice could effectively take 
place. 
The basis for BEE policy emanates from South Africa’s founding document, 
namely the new constitution, which provides the basis for policy formulation. 
Judge Albie Sachs argues that BEE is one of the policies that give practical 
meaning to the equality embedded in the constitution in his interpretation of the 
three clauses of section 9 of the constitution: 
section 9(1), which affirms the right of everyone to equal protection under 
the law; section 9(2), which is aimed specifically at the extension of 
equality to those who were previously denied that status; and section 9(3), 
which demands fairness in the pursuit of equality in a way that supports 
the economic and social transformation of the South African society35. 
Sachs asserts that: 
‘There is no question that BEE, devised properly, is supported and even 
demanded by The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996…Just as our constitution acknowledges the historical patterns of 
subordination that have characterised our country’s development, so it 
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seek to affirm law, policies and practices that advance equality and human 
dignity’36. 
Sachs’s arguments further clarify the challenge of satisfying two incompatible 
objectives of ‘overcoming all forms of structured advantage without establishing 
an anachronistic or disjunctive compensation for past injustices’37. The preceding 
arguments support the futuristic orientation of distributive justice. It also contains 
strong egalitarian assumptions. BEE is a catalyst in the whole process of 
transforming race-based economic discrimination into non-racial economic 
equality.  
Black ownership and control as the primary driver of economic transformation is 
justified on egalitarian grounds. Among its cardinal objectives is what the 
preamble to the BBBEE Act refers to as the realisation of ‘the constitutional right 
to equality’, ‘a more equitable income distribution’, ‘equality of opportunity’38.  
In this essay I am in agreement with Judge Sachs’s argument that BEE should be 
an equitable social contract that addresses past discrimination without being 
entangled by compensatory demands for past injustices. 
Furthermore, BEE as a ‘moral imperative’39 is founded on the premise of equality 
and justice. However, the desirable ‘direct enhancement to interpersonal 
equality’40 that is paramount in any egalitarian society does not seem to find full 
expression in the conception and implementation of BEE policy. Although BEE 
emanates from a constitution that upholds the primacy of equality at the 
interpersonal level, it is not clear whether BEE policy’s equality refers to ‘group or 
interpersonal’41.  While most proponents of this policy expect that it will yield a 
more racially equal South Africa, the ‘direct equity effects’42 in its conception are 
not easy to discern.  
Former president Thabo Mbeki expressed the need to ‘create and strengthen a 
black capitalist class’43.This view affirms the pivotal role played by owners and 
controllers of means of production in facilitating the process of transformation. As 
already mentioned, I concur with the view that holds ownership and control as a 
sine qua non in BEE. 
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This is also captured in the African National Congress (ANC) proposal for 
transforming the economy. The ANC acknowledges the stabilising effect of 
conservative macro-economic policies and their importance in establishing a 
platform for growth; however, they feel that other well-coordinated strategies such 
as control and ownership of productive assets by black people and women would 
add the impetus towards achieving racial economic equality.  
The ANC further posits that, ‘Economic growth whilst being a necessary condition 
to raise the living standards of the people, is unlikely to reduce the racial and 
income inequalities of the society unless the growth process is accompanied by 
creative and social programmes that address these inequalities’44.  
They argue that 
BEE is part of the overall transformation and democratisation of the South 
African state and society, thus BEE should be aimed at maximising the 
number of ordinary communities who increase their share of participation, 
not only in creating improved material conditions, but also in determining 
the depth, direction and pace of economic transformation45. 
The ANC also hopes to co-opt the emergent black capitalist class to ensure joint 
commitment and the necessary involvement in the process of effectively 
addressing the legacy of underdevelopment and under-investment, which 
resulted in a skewed distribution of jobs and opportunities.  
While the ruling party does not prescribe a cogent description of BEE, the 
preceding arguments capture the gist of their standpoint. I am uncomfortable in 
the way that the group as opposed to the individual is the primary focus of the 
stated argument. There is also a strong emphasis on the state as an enabler and 
leader in driving the policy of BEE. The discussion does not seem to contain 
strong egalitarian attributes. BEE must have egalitarian values and be driven by a 
strong sense of justice and fairness if it is to attain its primary objective.  
Mashudu Ramano concurs with the ANC when he says, ‘Empowerment means 
democratisation of ownership of economic resources, creation of a significant 
entrepreneurial class among blacks …improved living conditions of blacks and 
elimination of race in economic activities’46. 
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Saki Macozoma presents an eloquent defence of the primacy of the individual in 
minimalist BEE policy in his assertion that, ‘The most important concept that 
supports BEE is the de-racialisation of the South African economy’47. He also 
feels that detractors of BEE policy are not willing to face up to the fact that this 
process is redistributing capital and other related resources into black hands. He 
refutes the argument that narrowly-defined BEE policy enriches only a few 
individuals, pointing out that this policy is carved within a capitalist economy and 
therefore it will yield results akin to its economic context. Thus he argues that the 
concentration of black-owned and black-controlled wealth in few hands is not in 
itself a problem since it enables previously excluded individuals the opportunity to 
forge new organisations with different ethos and strategies that effectively 
changes the cultural compositions of business leadership. He further argues that 
BEE must remove all obstacles that might hinder an individual, but that it must 
enable new owners of business to increase the level of diversity in different 
industries and also alter the strategies of their new businesses. 
Macozoma is by far the strongest proponent of substantive ownership and control 
by black people as opposed to the broad-based collective schemes that dilute 
individual shareholding to the extent that it preserves the status quo. He believes 
that BEE is succeeding in distributing wealth and opportunities. He questions how 
a diffused broad-based shareholding can begin to de-racialise the economy and 
establish new inter- and intra-organisational relationships that lead to racial 
economic equality and a more just distribution of opportunities. 
His argument is based on his belief that the economic question being addressed 
by BEE is the total exclusion that is inadvertently being turned into controlled 
inclusion by BBBEE for purposes that are inimical to racial economic equality or a 
more just distribution of wealth and opportunities. He thinks that there is a clash 
of expectations when people expect narrowly-defined BEE to solve all the socio-
economic maladies without appreciating its profound contribution in changing the 
composition of the corporate landscape. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that BEE is seen as the primary and most important contributor in the process of 
creating a distributively just society. 
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Implicit in the preceding arguments is the acceptance that there is a need for a 
formidable business class among black people. This class would form the 
backbone of owners and controllers of capital who would effect changes in the 
intra- and inter-organisational relationships.  
In essence, BEE is seen as neither ‘affirmative action nor a straight swap of 
wealth from white hands into black hands … It is part of a growth strategy that 
seeks to address the South African economy’s weakest point: inequality,’48 which 
is a function of exclusionary policies. It works on the premise that the exclusion of 
the previously disadvantaged individuals from the mainstream economy 
proportionately reduced the number of entrepreneurs and business leaders, thus 
never allowing the country’s economy to perform at its full potential. This would 
lead to a more equitable distribution of productive assets in terms of racial 
groupings that would broaden the economic base to everyone’s advantage. 
Macozoma’s assertion is based on that which has been proven by experience to 
be untrue: the fact that most people who are taking advantage of BEE 
opportunities are entrepreneurs. It is also contestable whether many primary 
beneficiaries of the process are fully autonomous and are true partners in the 
enterprises that they have shareholding, or whether they are just peripheral 
owners tinkering with productive assets that mainly remain in the hands of 
previously advantaged. I accept the principle of protecting and encouraging 
individuals to participate in the opportunities that emanate from the policy of BEE; 
however, I am sceptical of the equitability of access and the meritocracy of 
participants. 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) feels that BEE should 
never be severed from the inclusive fundamental transformation of both the state 
and society. Sam Shilowa, then General Secretary, commented in 1994 that a 
‘meaningful empowerment of workers and the black communities in the 
ownership, control and management of economic resources’49 was the only 
acceptable form of empowerment to COSATU. According to Shilowa, any 
substitution of white elites by black elites without broadening the ownership of 
resources and enabling participation by workers in particular is a form of 
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‘tokenism’50. This standpoint is what informs trade unions forming their own 
investment companies. 
This articulated premise is natural to the trade union movement; however, the 
issue is how you make sure that the burdens and benefits of empowerment are 
substantive to the majority of workers. At the level of principle, the participation by 
a large number of workers per se does not detract from the desired ‘equity 
effects’ that are expected from an intervention intended to lead to a more 
pluralistic society. 
In a similar vein, the South African Communist Party (SACP) speaks of a 
‘democratic economic empowerment that ensures socio-political stability’51. The 
SACP is calling for a holistic BEE process that ensures the growth and 
sustainability of the whole socio-economic system. They refute any process that 
is embedded in the ‘top-down managerialism (in the name of professionalism) 
that might be inherited by the new elite to protect newly acquired privilege and 
power’52. 
These sentiments are only valid where the equality of opportunity or access has a 
bias towards the privileged and well educated. In a process of fair equality of 
opportunity where differentiation is a function of individual prowess or acumen, 
the arguments are not valid. If policy favours individuals by some other arbitrary 
attribute – whether colour, gender or class bases – these sentiments become 
valid. Thus, the key is to evaluate whether BEE can stand up to the test of 
equality of opportunity at the level of principle. The general tenor of this essay is 
that it does not. 
Phinda Madi provides an insular view of BEE when he suggests that BEE occurs 
‘every time a black person acquires the means to earn a living’53 since the 
objectives of BEE are far-reaching and intended to change the economic 
landscape in the long-term. 
For the sake of completeness, it is important to look at some of the comments on 
the conceptual framework with respect to values and norms as alluded to at the 
beginning of this section. 
One of the proponents of BEE eloquently asserts that: 
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Black Economic empowerment is not a panacea to all the social ills 
confronting our society. Centuries of exploitation cannot be reversed by 
just twelve years of economic empowerment initiatives. We must accept 
the consequences of the policy choices we have made to reconstruct and 
develop our post-apartheid economy, and devise innovative means to deal 
with the unintended consequences generated by our policy choices. Black 
economic empowerment is capitalistic in character and seeks to influence 
change within a capitalist order54. 
The preceding argument is forwarded by a number of commentators who imply 
that the possible exclusion of other members of society is a consequence of an 
intervention designed to redress inequalities within a capitalistic system. The 
premise of this argument is that the big beneficiaries of narrowly defined BEE are 
active entrepreneurs who are merely taking advantage of opportunities arising 
from a capitalist system. This illustrates the main point of departure of this essay 
namely the conflation of the group with the individual. At one level the 
beneficiaries of this process deal in races and not individuals; at another level 
they argue the process is capitalistic and therefore driven by a strong 
individualistic ethic in terms of values, with the concomitant results of excessive 
inequalities. 
From a liberal point of view, race groups cannot approximate the primacy of 
interpersonal equality. Moral agency can only be attributed to individuals who can 
be penalised or benefited by a policy.  
In the final analysis, what emerges is the divergence of views that are anchored 
on either a minimalist or maximalist emphasis in terms of BEE. Most of these 
views reflect a perspective clouded by individuals’ stations in life but do not reflect 
an evaluation of the efficacy of BEE as a policy in terms of of guiding principles 
and values. 
Most of the arguments would require empirical evidence to sustain. In the 
following section I shall present the Rawlsian framework as a means to evaluate 
BEE at the level of fundamental principles.  
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Section 3: Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
3.1 Introduction 
John Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, focuses on defining 
the conception of justice. It elicited a great deal of interest from scholars, legal 
and political thought leaders. Rawls’s cardinal objective is to achieve a social 
structure that will govern a well-ordered society through a social contract that 
balances liberty with equality. His theory is premised on the assumption that 
individuals are free and equal; that they have absolute rights that are based on 
justice that cannot be outweighed by communal considerations. Rawls argues for 
a pluralistic well-ordered society based on a fair, rationally negotiated social 
contract without any prerequisite religious or other predefined moral assumption. 
He posits a social contract founded on the basis that ‘free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept an initial position of equality 
as defining the fundamental terms of their association’55. The initial position forms 
the basis for a consensus on the basic governance structure to ‘distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation’56. Inequality is only permissible if it advantages the least 
advantaged members of the scheme.  
3.2 Original position and the veil of ignorance   
At the core of Rawls’s method of formulating the principles that govern the basic 
structure of society are free and equal members who are guided by justice and 
fairness and form part of a well-ordered society. His original position is an 
idealised situation where rational, free representative individuals of equal moral 
worth formulate principles to govern institutions to ensure the distribution of all 
social primary goods. 
Rawls posits a cooperative scheme of governance that is a product of every 
individual’s contribution and is fair and equitable. It is based on a system whereby 
every individual’s choice incorporates consideration for every member of this 
community. Each representative individual voluntarily participates in the 
formulation and execution of its rules of governance.  
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In a similar vein as the concept of ‘ubuntu’57 the scheme is premised on 
cooperation in the distribution of primary social goods. The scheme of 
arrangement is based on the idea that every individual would act in his or her 
best interest, which would be in everybody’s interests.  
Rawls’s description of primary social goods is as follows, ‘For simplicity, assume 
that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, 
powers and opportunities, income and wealth’58. 
Rawls assumes an egalitarian system where all participate in the overall yield of 
primary goods. In this framework, Rawls concedes that income differences may 
exist in the process of allowing individuals to practise their gifts and talents and 
enhancing the output in the scheme to a level that could not be reached in a 
system with equal incomes.  
These self-interested representative participants make cooperative choices that 
are advantageous to all members of the scheme behind what Rawls calls a veil of 
ignorance. In Rawls’s framework, this establishes fairness in the overall process 
and would results in a just set of principles being chosen. The interplay between 
individuals pursuing their own programmes of life while being fully cognisant of 
the need for social cooperation of others ensures the basic social structure is 
both just and fair. The parties in the scheme have general knowledge of human 
sciences and social context but are ignorant of morally irrelevant issues such as 
race, gender and social standing. In Rawls’s model, it is more important to uphold 
the basic principles that govern their cooperation from a shared moral point of 
view. Thus, the choices of the principles of governance for this social structure 
are made from an informed and enlightened position without some of the 
irrelevant identities that prejudices some of the socio-economic choices that are 
made in real life. Every member of this scheme is principally involved in the 
enactment of these principles of governance. 
He further posits that parties in the original position will rationally agree upon two 





3.3 The first principle (Liberty Principle) 
‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’59. 
3.4 The second principle (Difference and Equal Opportunities Principles)  
‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle, and  
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity’60. 
Rawls differentiates between the general and specific conception of justice. The 
general conception is summarised as follows: ’All social primary goods – liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to 
the advantage of the least favoured’61. 
Rawls’s first principle entails the distribution of specific basic liberties; the second 
principle entails both the distribution of opportunities and status of authority and 
the distribution of wealth and income. According to Rawls, these principles are 
serially arranged such that the first principle precedes the second one and the 
first portion of the second principle precedes the second portion. None can be 
degraded for the sake of the other. There are only limited instances where these 
principles could be violated, such as places where ‘there are severe limitations of 
liberty – the regulation of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought in ways 
consistent with public order, and the limitation on the scope of majority rule’62. 
These principles assume a certain minimally decent level of existence where the 
citizens do not live in abject poverty or primitive non-ideal conditions.  
The first principle is premised on a functional democratic system with the 
concomitant protection of citizens’ fundamental liberties. It presupposes a 
citizenry that has a stake in the socio-political structure that ensure their ability to 
construct and develop what Rawls calls ‘a conception of their own good’63, which 
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would enable them to formulate the terms and conditions of their social 
cooperation. These basic liberties relate to the standard tenets of constitutional 
democracies such as ‘the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, and the 
freedom of speech, assembly, conscience, thought, the right to hold (personal) 
property, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of 
the rule of law’64. Rawls’s first principle is fundamentally egalitarian and forms the 
basis of interacting for the contracting parties in this particular scheme of 
arrangement.  
The second principle sets out preconditions for socio-economic inequalities that 
might arise because of policy choices. The principle must proceed from a 
situation of fair equality of opportunity. The first part of this principle, clause (a), is 
known as the Difference Principle. This clause is concerned with the distribution 
of social primary goods (goods, wealth, authority and responsibility) as opposed 
to natural primary goods (health, vigour, intelligence and imagination) whose 
basic structure must be arranged such that its inequalities benefit the worse off.  
The Difference Principle is a high-level concept that provides the precepts of how 
wealth is transferred from the relatively advantaged to the least advantaged. 
Clause (b) is known as the Equal Opportunity Principle. This clause encourages 
the community to endeavour to provide all its citizenry with equal opportunity by 
ameliorating inequalities that emanate from what Rawls calls accidents of birth or 
social conditioning. Rawls’s principles have a strong consideration for the least 
advantaged and he introduces a concept derived from optimisation called the 
Maximin Rule. This game theory concept holds that ‘it is rational to maximize the 
minimum when choosing between different alternatives’65. 
He feels that those who are disadvantaged would genuinely feel aggrieved if 
some opportunities were not open to them and as a consequence they were 
derailed from realising their life programmes.  
Given the fact that Rawls’s principles are based on an egalitarian conception of 
the good, he posits that the bases of self-respect of the least advantaged should 
find institutions that enable them to have a positive sense of their own worth as 
individuals and to be able to carry out their plans of life with self-confidence. 
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He asserts that self-respect emanates from a proper application of the two 
principles: ‘when society follows these principles, everyone’s good is included in 
a scheme of mutual benefit and this public affirmation in institutions of each 
man’s endeavors support men’s self-esteem’66. 
Before proceeding to the next section it is critical to recall Rawls’s defence of the 
egalitarian virtues of his Difference Principle. He asserts: 
We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any 
more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve 
the superior character that enables us to cultivate our abilities is also 
problematic; for such character depends in good part on fortunate family 
and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit. The 
notion of desert does not apply here67. 
This statement from Rawls acknowledges the inherent inequality that arises from 
the fact that others are more advantaged at the very beginning of life and that a 
fair system would seek to ameliorate this imbalance. Rawls defends the 
egalitarian merits of his Difference Principle, which is intended to give some 
credence to the concept of redress by addressing imbalances that are a 
consequence of the ‘natural lottery’68. 
He posits that the ‘the principle of redress cannot be the sole criterion of justice 
… but it must be compared to other principles such as the principle to improve 
the average standard of life or to advance the common good’69. 
In keeping with Rawls’s argument, I accept that the Difference Principle suffices 
for the resolution of the problem of inequalities since it only allows inequalities 
‘that would be to everyone’s benefit’70. The only allowed inequality is that which 
benefits the least advantaged and by benefiting the least advantaged in absolute 
and not relative terms. I take the Difference Principle along with other features of 
Rawls theory that are stated above. I am fully cognisant of the fact that this 
principle is not only applicable to economic inequalities but covers other aspects 
such as opportunities and self-respect.  
I subscribe to Rawls’s defence when he argues that with opportunities and offices 
open to all, economic disparities will not be as accentuated. He comments: 
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We raise the expectations of the more advantaged only in ways required 
to improve the situation of the worst off. For the greater expectations of 
the more advantaged presumably cover the cost of training or answer 
organisational requirements, thereby contributing to the general 
advantage. While nothing guarantees that inequalities will not be 
significant, there is a persistent tendency for them to be levelled down by 
increasing availability of educated talent and ever widening 
opportunities71. 
The more complex primary good stated in Rawls’s theory is self-respect, which 
he calls the most important thing that cannot be distributed like other primary 
goods. He argues that self-respect is a function of his two principles of justice. He 
assumes that every concern of every member of the scheme is taken on board 
and each individual is affirmed such that her self-worth is maintained.  
The other assumption from Rawls’s explanation is that economic inequalities do 
not result in the least advantaged people’s self-respect being undermined and 
that in a well ordered society, ‘a rational individual does not suffer from envy’72. 
Moral value is assumed to be equal for all parties in the scheme. The effects of 
societal considerations that might make the least advantaged people view their 
wealthier counterparts as more valuable in a material sense are not taken into 
consideration in the analysis. 
Before I evaluate BEE as a distributive policy, suffice to say that there are other 
theories that deal with the subject of justice but the preceding framework provides 
the most appropriate yardstick for evaluating BEE. I now turn my attention to the 






Section 4: Rawls’s Theory of Distributive Justice would move 
South Africa to greater economic equality 
As a preamble to this part of the paper and as a basis for my argument that 
Rawls’s theory of distributive justice would move South Africa closer to greater 
economic equality it is perhaps appropriate to quote him directly: 
Despite the individualistic features of justice as fairness, the two principles 
of justice are not contingent upon existing desires or present social 
conditions. They can serve a standard for appraising institutions and for 
guiding the overall direction of social change. In order to find an 
Archimedean point it is not necessary to appeal to a priori or perfectionist 
principles. By assuming certain general desires, such as the desire for 
primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the agreements that would 
be made in a suitably defined initial situation, we can achieve the requisite 
independence from existing circumstances73. 
For ease of analysis, I assume the primacy of egalitarian values that underpin 
both the South African constitution and BEE policy and I contrast that with 
Rawls’s principles, which are founded on liberal values. I shall follow the structure 
of Rawls’s Theory of Justice and draw parallels and contrasts that show how far 
BEE falls short of the Rawlsian ideal. 
Some of the most attractive features of Rawls’s Theory of Justice are the 
assumptions of liberty and equality, which appraise the individual as the primary 
focus of any social structure that will be negotiated by the parties. Comparatively, 
BEE objectives emanating from constitutional provisions are to ‘overcome all 
forms of structured advantage … the moral purpose is intrinsically and 
inextricably bound up with social function’74. Thus, the imperative to achieve 
economic equality must be achieved by balancing the relative sacrifice of the 
economic majority with the relative need of the economic minority within the 
economy of means and without impinging on anyone’s human dignity. 
Rawls, a Kantian, presents his veil of ignorance (discussed in the previous 
section): each individual representative person chooses on the basis of her self-
interest, which is premised on a principled general consideration that applies 
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equally to all. Rawls’s contractarianism demands consensus, which fully takes 
into account each individual’s individuality. Each representative person must 
independently coalesce with the consensus. ‘This arguably ensures that each 
individual has significant moral liberty to pursue her own projects and significant 
protection from interference from others. It also arguably ensures that justice is 
sensitive to the past and to distributive considerations’75. 
In this sense, the meaning of justice is taken to be ‘comparative fairness’76, and 
assumes the basis of BEE was initiated for an autonomous individual who 
chooses to be an entrepreneur to realise his goals.  
Given this background, we can safely conclude that narrowly-defined BEE fails 
Rawls’s liberty principle since it is conceived to correct injustice between groups 
as opposed to individuals. 
In spite of the fact that BEE’s claim to legitimacy is premised on the desirable 
‘constitutional right to equality’, the policy is formulated in such a way that it 
focuses on inequality between races but not individuals. As Daryl Glaser puts it, 
‘In consequence of concentrating on equality amongst races but not individuals, 
BEE ignores interpersonal inequalities … to the extent that it self-consciously 
promotes an economic elite within the black race group; BEE is premised on 
interpersonal inequality’77. BEE does not contain any safeguards for individual 
autonomy as a participant. 
To give the preceding analysis a real life bite, the following framework for 
analysing the empowerment of African Americans is helpful. Henderson’s 
framework provides a practical explanation of what is envisaged in Rawls’s first 
principle: there is a need for setting strategic goals and objectives by individuals, 
institutions and communities with the goal of expanding the resources of a given 
group. This interaction has a compounding effect that  
generates even higher levels of resource attainment ... in the expansion 
and development of diverse resources, entrepreneurs transact and 
contract to a larger network of participants. This process allows the 
enabling and building of individual, organisational, and institutional 
networks, of which the empowered organisation is part. In other words, 
25 
 
when one force is empowered, most forces connected with it are actually 
and potentially empowered78. 
The chiasm followed in this process creates the balance between the individual 
as a participant and the group as a collective in terms of economic 
empowerment. 
To contextualise Rawls’s second principle, it is important to accept that it has to 
do with the ‘distribution of social and economic advantages’79. In other words, 
inequality in the distribution of these; goods, wealth, authority and responsibility 
should be arranged such that they are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged. The second portion states that, ‘positions to which greater goods 
and authority accrue are open to all persons’80. 
Herein lies the Achilles heel of BEE. In spite of being a policy emanating from the 
most liberal constitution and having the goal of systematically reversing incessant 
inequality in the South African economy, BEE falls short of the Rawlsian ideal, 
which states that ‘inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in 
compensating benefits for everyone and in particular for the least advantaged 
members of society’81. 
While BEE is justified in that it can enhance economic growth, which would be 
compatible to Rawls’s ‘improving the standard of life or to advance the common 
good’. However, BEE is not a well-structured social contract with institutional 
support to ensure the principles are preserved to ensure effective 
implementation.  
If one assumes that the South African constitution and BEE policies are premised 
on liberal values, then one cannot but wonder why BEE conflates real persons 
with groups in its calculus of participation in BEE opportunities. Only individuals, 
not groups, have moral agency. Thus, BEE as currently conceived is at cross-
purposes with the pluralistic values that are based on a  
political viewpoint that values individual liberty/freedom; the individual is 
prior to, or more important than the state –  the function of the state is to 
protect individual liberty and freedom – individuals ought to be allowed to 
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pursue their own ends/goals – the state respects diversity and does not 
attempt to impose a single lifestyle on all individuals82. 
The process of BEE is best described by Glaser when he says ‘BEE’s 
identification of beneficiaries involves a two-step metaphysic: first conceptualising 
groups as moral personalities with rights and entitlements, then particular 
persons as embodiments of those groups, entitled to claim whole group shares’83. 
A close examination of BEE policy reflects the fact that while the policy might 
have initially been conceived to arrest patterns of economic distributions 
premised on subordination and gross inequality and the promotion and 
affirmation of equality and human dignity, there is no strong institutional 
framework to ensure that these principles are carried out at the level of 
implementation. The primacy of the individual does not seem to find expression 
at every level of consideration in this policy. 
This leads to the second clause of Rawls’s second principle, namely the Equal 
Opportunity Principle. Robert Lane says, ‘this seems to be the straightforward 
requirement that all individuals are to be eligible for the position and offices which 
bring greater pay and authority … but [Rawls] hastens to remind us that this 
process is contingent upon ”society making all individuals equally eligible’84. 
On the issue of access, BEE policy is such that the equality envisaged is not 
ordinarily clear to everyone as to how its principles are applied. Is it equality of 
opportunity or outcome?  
Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity calls for ‘a certain set of institutions that 
assures similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated 
and keeps positions and offices open to all on the basis of qualities and efforts 
reasonably related to the relevant duties and tasks’85. BEE on the other hand 
does not have objective institutions that ensure equitable access to opportunities 
and offices of influence.  
BEE falls far too short of this Rawlsian yardstick in that access is more open to 
those who are beneficiaries of what amounts to an ‘unnatural lottery’ of belonging 
to an elite group that has control of access to opportunity and can determine the 
outcomes. There are no set criteria of equal motivation or qualities except being 
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part of the privileged group. And this is significant in that it points to something 
much deeper than a failure of implementation (which is not the focus of this 
paper): Rawls’s framework demands that representative individuals in the 
scheme of arrangement be free moral agents who can carry out their own 
programmes of life. The social contract they enter into must work to the benefit of 
the worst off people in society. If it does not, it is unjust and the government 
should intervene to eliminate inequality. BEE is indeed a redistributive 
mechanism designed to eliminate inequality between black and white people but 
its lack of protection for the individual has unintended consequences of excessive 
interpersonal inequality within the black race. 
It is my contention that redistributive justice policies by their very nature are the 
province of governments since they carry substantive externalities that may arise 
at conception or implementation. These require interventions that would ensure 
that the policy would be to the greatest benefit of the poorest of the poor. 
Conceptually, Professor Sono argues, ‘BEE related companies should be socially 
and politically rooted with the aim of empowering the black community by 
satisficing between two conflicting but mutually reinforcing interests, that are 
socio-political or collective (which is developmental) and economic interests of 
the entrepreneur (which is profit-maximising)’86. 
This would enable the government – the facilitator of both the conceptualisation 
and implementation – to ensure that the concept is directed at the greatest 
benefit of the poorest of the poor. 
Implicit in Rawls’s second principle, which expects people of equal or similar 
motivation to be given equal opportunities, is the notion of meritocracy. The 
distribution of opportunities emanating from BEE policy is not a function of 
meritocracy either than the lottery of belonging to an elite group. Nor are they 
underpinned by a strong people-centred governance structure that ensures that 
these opportunities accrue to the greatest benefit of the poorest of the poor. 
Another weakness lies in the practice of BEE. Contrary to what was alluded to in 
the previous section (that BEE is designed for autonomous individuals who 
decide to become entrepreneurs to carry out their own programme of life) most 
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beneficiaries of the BEE process take advantage of the opportunities made 
available by existing organisations to this elite group. These participants have 
neither strategy nor tangible contributions to add value to existing enterprises. 
Their major contribution is their percentage holding in the enterprise, which helps 
the organisation to be compliant with existing legislation. 
This is at the level of implementation; however, it is still indicative of a conceptual 
problem. Rawls, as a Kantian, assumes that individuals are ends in themselves 
and therefore are not used as a mere means to an end. Thus his theory insists on 
consensus in the decision-making process of representative participants in the 
scheme of arrangement. BEE is private sector driven and its parameters are 
largely in the hands of private sector practitioners who prefer silent partners – 
people who come from total exclusion to participate in controlled inclusion for 
purposes that are sometimes inimical to the cause of transforming the South 
African economic landscape. 
BEE operates with less stringent government involvement, thus the tenor of BEE 
is set by private sector organisations. In this sense it is instructive to hearken to 
Moeletsi Mbeki’s comments about the reparations mentality of the elite that result 
in ‘the black upper middle class dominating the country’s political life but playing 
next to no role in the ownership and control of the productive economy of South 
Africa; its key role is overseeing the redistribution of wealth towards 
consumption’87.  
Without the active participation of the elite group in the principled and 
fundamental transformation of the South African corporate landscape, the 
objectives of BEE remain peripheral at best and far from being directed to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged people in South Africa. The primacy of 
the individual is paramount in Rawls’s framework of distributive justice. 
Government’s weak involvement in not only setting the parameters but also 
ensuring that the BEE policy benefits South Africa as a whole and particularly 
benefits the marginalised is a profound weakness. 
Lastly, Rawls’s principles are serially arranged to make sure that the second 




Imagine …that men forego certain political rights when the economic 
returns are significant and their capacity to influence the course of policy 
the exercise of these rights would be marginal in any case. It is this kind of 
exchange which the two principles as stated rule out; being arranged in 
serial order they do not permit exchanges between basic liberties and 
economic and social gains88. 
The predominant form of BEE may not be a blatant exchange of basic liberties for 
economic and social gains. However, its modus operandi is to benefit from 
representativeness without any contribution in influencing the direction of policy 
or the relational inter- and intra-company transformation – this is a tacit exchange 
of liberties for economic benefit.  
Moeletsi Mbeki’s charge that most BEE participants are not entrepreneurs but 
perpetual victims whose stock and trade is an entitlement mentality that feeds on 
benefits from reparations seems valid when the influence of BEE beneficiaries on 
the economic front is evaluated. 
Thus, BEE fails the Rawlsian test at the level of preserving the primacy of liberty 
and personal freedom to pursue one’s own programme of life. 
It is fair to conclude that if Rawls’s principles were stringently applied they would 
provide the basic principles that would move South Africa to a greater level of 
pluralism, given their consistency and robustness as a framework for a 
transforming society.  
I will now look at some direct comments by some policy analysts and practitioners 
that support the empirical evidence of failure of implementation that emanate 
from a conceptual weakness. 
Given the fact that only individuals have moral agency and groups do not, it is 
therefore not surprising that while BEE reduces inter-racial inequalities, it has no 
effect on intra-racial inequalities. If anything it exacerbates them. Therefore, 
measured in terms of ‘direct equity effects’, BEE is not effective.  
At a practical level, BEE was designed to open up the economy in such a way 
that it changes the intra- and inter-firm relational structures and the concomitant 
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networks that influence who participates in the mainstream economy. It was 
envisaged that this process would fundamentally change the mainstream 
economy’s racial profile to meaningfully include previously excluded black 
individuals.  
In practice, BEE has not effected any significant transformation of existing 
corporate structures. The general impression is that BEE has limited impact or 
that it is entrenching existing structures but co-opting some members from the 
previously excluded communities. There is no clear evidence in substance or 
implementation modalities that indicate a significant change in the values and 
patterns of doing business in South Africa, which could be traced to BEE 
interventions. In a presentation quoted by Daron Acemeglo et al, Deputy 
President Kgalema Monthlanthe observes that ‘BEE could facilitate a transfer of 
economic power but not a transformation of economic power’89. There is 
therefore a feeling that BEE as framed has had minimal impact on existing 
corporate structures. Joel Netshitenze’s question reflects the frustration of many 
observers when he asked, ‘How do you ensure that the people drawn into 
business do not merely get co-opted into the culture they find there, but rather 
that they help to find a better form of South African capitalism?’90. 
As Acemoglu et al comment: 
It is difficult to get beyond these numbers (The BEE deals done over the 
past five to eight years), however, and see whether structures, mindsets 
and behavioural patterns are really changing or whether the macro-culture 
is holding firm and elites are making minor adjustments at the edges of 
their networks91. 
Among the imperatives that are mentioned in the enactment of BEE policy is the 
issue of economic growth. It proceeds from the assumption that once 
participation in economic opportunities is open to all, this would have a profound 
impact on economic growth. Acemoglu et al reached the conclusion that BEE is 
less likely to be a growth catalyst given the fact that it has not been established 
empirically which affects greater growth or equity. They assert that, ‘Much of the 
current discussion on the impact of BEE is hopelessly misconceived in the sense 
that it cannot identify the true causal effect of BEE’92. In their empirical 
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investigations they found no causal link between increased levels of investment 
and higher productivity with BEE policy93. The response from companies does 
not show BEE’s profound impact on corporate performance perhaps because 
companies have not fully complied and are keen on maintaining status quo by 
minimally complying with BEE requirements and choosing those that will least 
dilute their franchises. 
The above evidence leads one to believe that BEE as currently conceived has 
not had an extensive impact on the existing structures and patterns of capital 
formation. 
On the general macro-economic front, some empirical evidence seems to 
suggest that there is a general widening in overall inequality and within the black 
race group. Beyond the recorded crisis of having about 8 million unemployed 
persons in South Africa, which in itself widens the overall level of inequality, there 
is a continuing trend towards greater inequality. According to Professor Jean 
Trichart, the overall Gini co-efficient rose from 0.60 to 0.64 in the first decade of 
post-apartheid South Africa. Among black people, it rose from 0.53 to 0.64, 
among coloured people from 0.48 to 0.56 and among Indians 0.47 to 0.5094. 
These increases cannot be all attributable to BEE policy; however it is concerning 
that they occur behind a backdrop of heightened social intervention by 
government in terms of grants to the poor, and a growing black middle class. 
Suffice to say there is no evidence of the policy significantly deflecting the 
widening income inequality. 
Having established that Rawls’s distributive justice would lead us closer to a 
more pluralistic society as opposed to BEE as currently implemented, I now turn 




Section 5: Objections, replies and counter arguments 
I have consistently argued that the raison d’être for Black Economic 
Empowerment policy is to achieve racial economic equality. But there might be 
other points of view that are raised to counter that thesis, and some of these are 
discussed below.  
5.1 There is an agenda for BEE other than racial economic equality 
Some proponents of BEE posit that this policy is necessary because there is a 
need to create a black business class by de-racialising the South African 
economy. They argue that it is necessary to acknowledge that access to the 
market in South Africa has been politically and racially structured and as such, 
the initiation of a new dispensation needs to unravel those distortions of the past. 
Ironically, BEE ‘evinces strong elements of continuity with, as well as disjuncture 
from the past’95.  These proponents argue that the creation of a black business 
class ensures more possibilities for the working class in a new dispensation and it 
should not be construed as the betrayal of the poor. The import of this argument 
arises from the feeling that curbing black accumulation of assets from BEE 
transactions cannot reduce inequalities and South Africans should devise 
strategies that deal with the unintended consequences of building a black 
capitalist class. There are other forms of intervention –  such as socially 
responsible investments – that can form part of the efforts to deal with poverty 
alleviation. Other social inequalities affect the greater part of society.  
While accepting the need for the establishment of a black business class, it is 
problematic to evince vestiges of past patterns of the distribution of wealth and 
opportunities. It is fundamentally problematic to view BEE outside the framework 
of a values-based scheme of distributive justice. This would imply that that you 
need the business class almost at any cost, yet the key currency to participate is 
your proximity to political power and sometimes a higher level of education. This 
precipitates exclusion from participation and also points to an unequal playing 
field. There is no provision that seeks to protect the interest of the disadvantaged 
except the suggestion that they may participate in socially responsible 
investments – this suggests handouts. The bases of self-esteem of the worst off 
individuals are further marginalised in this process that relegates them to second-
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class citizens. Individual autonomy is subsumed in group consideration, to a 
similar extent as in the previous dispensation save the fact that there is no 
legislation to prohibit participation.  
A number of prominent black businessmen, particularly Khehla Shubane and 
Sakkie Macozoma, argue that BEE is taking place in a capitalist construct and 
therefore it bears the characteristics that specific economic dispensation. 
Macozoma even goes so far as to ask how you could expect a capitalist 
intervention to produce a socialist result.  
This is a line of argument that subscribes to trickle-down theory, which holds that 
as the leading business people get rich they endeavour to assist the less 
privileged through the benefits they derived from their participation. It is almost 
impossible to develop a pluralistic outcome – which is the ultimate goal of BEE – 
through individuals without a carefully coordinated scheme of arrangement.                             
This is not consistent with a values-driven process that would seek to protect the 
well-being of the least advantaged. From a Rawlsian perspective, you need to 
establish guiding principles that ensure that those who are least privileged are 
taken care of, since all policy choices are chosen based on their strength in 
maximising the minimum (maximum principle) 
By definition, BEE is an intervention by government to rectify past injustices and 
establish principles that will ensure equal access and a more economically equal 
society. This argument  
focuses BEE discourse and practice on the career mobility/advancement 
of black managerial, professional and business ranks without seeking to 
alter the conditions that simultaneously engendered privileges for the 
minority on the one hand and sustained exploitation and marginalisation of 
the majority on the other96. 
Rawls’s distributive justice is not contingent on the type of system; rather it is a 
comprehensive set of principles that can be applied to arrive at a more egalitarian 
society. This is consistent with BEE’s long-term objective. 
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Given the predominant forms of BEE, which tend to be minority equity holding, it 
stands to reason that those who are involved would emphasise the capitalistic 
nature of the economic landscape.  
It also presupposes a situation of significant control of the means of production, 
which is not the case. Most participants hold significant influence and can vote 
negatively on the company strategic direction but not enough to affect the 
necessary intra- and inter-firm relational patterns that change the status quo. 
5.2 BEE has established role models and solidarity among previously   
disadvantaged individuals 
Another argument advanced is that BEE has redistributed an equal sense of 
belonging to all South Africans, particularly previously disadvantaged members of 
the community. Thus there is a degree of solidarity felt by the section of the 
population that is not included in the redistribution of wealth and the resultant 
bourgeois lifestyle. Glaser alludes to this possible phenomenon in his paper on 
egalitarian considerations of BEE. The idea is that black people have gained 
positive feelings as citizens of the new South Africa people through the 
movement of black people as a whole from total exclusion to controlled inclusion, 
although this inclusion does not accrue to all members of that community. This is 
a form of symbolic representation that emanates from the politics of solidarity 
among the previously disadvantaged.  
In a sense it is better that people from disadvantaged background are also 
involved and competing on an equal footing with the previously advantaged 
communities. It resonates with the idea that the bourgeoisie’s existence improves 
the chances of the working class expressing their issues on a sounder platform 
than in the apartheid era. This argument does not take into consideration the 
possibility of the symbiotic relationship between the bourgeoisie and the owners 
of capital, which renders the symbolic representation of the disadvantaged 
tenuous at best or ineffective at worst. 
Proponents of this argument also say that the policy contributed significantly in 
re-asserting the disadvantaged community’s self-respect through role modeling. 
BEE’s success stories recreate a sense of self-belief that black people can carry 
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out their own programmes of life and they can fulfill their intentions within the 
economy of their abilities. It is what Glaser calls a ‘direct redistributive effect’97 
whereby successful role models with gravitas are helping to extend the middle 
class by helping aspirant black professionals to become entrepreneurs and to ply 
their trades as independents. 
The counter to this line of argumentation is that while symbols and role models 
go a long way in igniting in people a desire to go beyond the mundane and 
execute their life programmes with great determination, there is a limit to 
symbolism; their success must be within the realm of possibilities. Blade 
Nzimande has a point when he says, ‘BEE ownership must be ownership geared 
towards developmental goals’98. In other words it must give people substance in 
terms of their programmes of life and realistically temper the patterns of capital 
accumulation and patterns of intra- and inter-firm relationships. 
The sense of belonging that disadvantaged black people might feel in the light of 
the emergent black business class has a positive impact in raising down-trodden 
disadvantaged people’s self-esteem but does not translate into mass emulation 
of the successful group. Establishing a sense of self-respect based on the 
estimation of others is a side benefit that is hard to inculcate except for those 
whose proximity to power is reasonably close, or for those who have had 
exceptional chances of harnessing skills and abilities. 
While BEE is a catalyst and to a limited extent is creating a small group of people 
whose confidence has been bolstered by the success of BEE participants, it is 
still a matter that awaits empirical evidence to prove whether role modeling is as 
extensive as purported to be in some quarters.  
Rawls’s principles are constructed to address most of the basic goods that 
individuals require and it includes the Difference Principles to address to a 
greater extent the needs of those who are least advantaged. Every participant in 
the decision process matters; therefore no-one is just an admirer of a process 




5.3 BEE is succeeding  
Some prominent businessmen are adamant that BEE is succeeding in de-
racialising the economy. They further argue that not every member of the black 
community is a potential business leader, and that it is sufficicient for government 
to create an enabling environment that ensures that there are no obstacles that 
may hinder an individual’s programme of life. It is believed without much 
evidence that the ‘the strategic impact of BEE lies in new owners altering the 
strategies of their newly acquired businesses, typically raising the ‘level of 
biodiversity’ in an industry’99. Macozoma believes that the centrality of economics 
in the resistance to domination and exclusion in South Africa should not be 
ignored when questions are raised on the efficacy of BEE100.    
Thus, even though they accept that Rawls’s theory is the most extensive in terms 
of presenting the fundamental principles needed to govern a well-ordered social 
structure, they express doubts as to the validity of having a scientific theory of 
justice that can be used as a standard to evaluate the basic structure of society. 
They argue that their society is governed by a diverse set of processes that 
influence interventions such as BEE. So, there can never be a single coherent 
set of principles that can evaluate BEE with regard to distributive justice.   
They argue that the principle of liberty may be paramount in Rawls’s thesis, but it 
assumes a more pluralistic society, and does not account for communities that 
have a majority of people who are marginalised and mostly poorly educated in 
appreciating high-level socio-political issues. It is also difficult to factor the 
realities that, if self-respect is a primary good, abject poverty and marginalisation 
have a negative effect on this particular good especially for those who are 
previously disadvantaged. 
They posit that the refined assumption that Rawls makes of the people in the 
original position – their appreciation for liberty is more refined and the 
assumption’s applicability in our communities is debatable. The level of 
sophistication requires a different set of social circumstances than those in South 
African. Macozoma ask how people could expect a ‘capitalist process to yield a 
socialist result’101, implying the great inequalities that have resulted in the 
redistribution process are natural to a capitalist system. Rawls’s Difference 
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Principle allows for inequality as long as it is to the benefit of the least 
advantaged without giving any parameters to what levels of inequality are 
acceptable or not, save the fact that the maxi-min calculus requires that the worst 
possible outcome chosen should be the best possible outcome for the least 
advantaged. Rawls presents the egalitarian underpins of his difference principle 
as when he disputes the notion of being advantaged by one’s circumstances of 
birth for which one cannot claim credit. 
Some commentators from the black community feel that while the theory might 
be robust it does not provide an adequate framework to deal with the 
fundamental issues of property and economic power and freedom that are 
pertinent in the South African scenario. They also feel that the primacy of the 
individual in pluralistic society is not perceived in the same way in the black 
communities, which tend to be communalistic, thus any scheme of arrangement 
will tend to appraise the group over the individual without protection for the 
inequalities that develop over time. Therefore, Rawls’s principles may not always 
be compatible to traditional societal norms, which may not predominate daily lives 
but form the undertone of most of the decisions black people take in terms of 
ethics and morality. 
A counter to the assertion that BEE is succeeding makes an unjustifiable 
assumption about the role of the bourgeoisie in the new corporate landscape. 
Given the fact that BEE is politically induced, it would more likely produce a 
‘parasitic’ bourgeoisie than a ‘productive black bourgeoisie’102. Blade Nzimande 
asserts that our current model of BEE is ‘compradorial’103and parasitic:  
Its compradorism reflects its reliance on the patronage of established 
capital, not just foreign, but also in particular, established sectors of 
domestic capital. This emerging class fraction has, typically, not 
accumulated its own capital through unleashing of productive processes, 
but relies on special share deals, affirmative action, BEE quotas, fronting, 
privatisation and trading on its one real piece of ‘capital’ (access to power) 
to establish itself … It is not involved in primitive accumulation, so much 
as primitive consumption104. 
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According to Moeletsi Mbeki, BEE is an invention of white business elite to make 
sure that the black political elite is co-opted into the mainstream economy in a 
controlled fashion. He further asserts that this political elite has developed fully 
fleshed reparations mentality, which makes them perpetual victims and guardians 
of the status quo. They must stay as victims to continue benefiting. He believes in 
the entrepreneurial spirit, which depends on one’s confidence that one could 
carry out one’s own programme of life and not depend on the kindness of the 
controllers of capital. The reparations mindset does not augur well for the 
development of genuine industries and genuine black owned companies.  
Mbeki feels that some of the perceived successful black owned companies are 
built on individuals who see themselves as ‘joining existing enterprises, the 
process of which is to be facilitated by the distributive state through reparations 
inspired legislation’105. 
BEE’s success still requires empirical evidence. Its impact on the current 
economic landscape seems minimal at best and the kind of values expected from 
the previously disadvantaged does not seem to be permeating the established 
order. The one-sided assumptions being made about the role of the recently 
empowered in the interplay between political and economic power are gratuitous 
in the light of the limited influence being exerted by BEE players who are not full 
principals and certainly not agents. Diversity cannot effectively occur in a 
situation where individual ingenuity is not easy to exercise because of the 
dominant culture in established corporates. Feelings of being co-opted are 
inimical to entrepreneurial creativity and given the large concentration of 
ownership and capital, black people cannot exert enough influence to start 
reshaping the mainstream economy. 
Rawls’s principles of justice are based on a social contract that is established 
between members of a community on the system of values that will govern their 
social structure. Similarly, BEE is a social contract among South Africans on how 
to address past inequalities, and how to establish a new economic order that will 
ensure stability in a just and equitable manner. Thus, the primacy of liberty and 
equality is paramount as a guiding principle regardless of the levels of plurality in 
that particular society. The criticism leveled against Rawls’s principles on the 
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basis of the lack of plurality puts the cart before the horse: a scheme such as that 
established by BEE that does not have a clear value system to underpin it will 
relegate the disadvantaged to the choices and decisions taken by those who are 
advantaged by the ‘lottery of life’. 
The calculus of Rawls’s Difference Principle – with its focus on choices that will 
ensure that the worst outcome is to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged – 
creates the balance between the trickle down that is a function of market vagaries 
and the justice required in the redistribution of primary goods. This mechanism is 
designed to ameliorate the inequalities that naturally accrue to an unabated 
capitalistic distribution of primary goods. These principles do not presuppose an 
already egalitarian society; rather they are fundamental guidelines to establish 
firm bases of self-respect as primary good for all autonomous individuals who 
would like to fulfill their own ends, regardless of their set of circumstances. It is 
therefore ironic to reject principles that are designed to protect the least fortunate 
for precisely the fact that their self-esteem has been dented by historical 
subjugation. The communal orientation of traditional African society would benefit 
from Rawls’ fundamental principles, which are geared towards building a 
consensus based on principles that can be universalised since they protect the 
individual in whatever context he operates and are guided by the justice as 
fairness.  
While the principle of redress is important as perceived by the previously 
disadvantaged it is more important to establish guiding principles that underpin 
interventions such as BEE not only for short term but also for long-term stability. 
Seen in the light of Rawls’s Theory of Justice, narrowly-defined BEE, which is 
limited to the conferring of ownership, management and control of South Africa’s 
financial and economic resources to previously disadvantaged individuals, does 
not measures up against Rawls’s theory of distributive justice.  
While BEE is a policy crafted in a constitutional democracy with individual rights, 
there are no guidelines that would ensure equal liberty as well as access to these 
opportunities. Access is a function of what Rawls calls accidents of history – 
connection with government gives an individual an unfair advantage as a citizen.  
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Unequal access to these opportunities belies the constitutional desire for a more 
pluralistic society. While Rawls requires a social structure where members share 
the benefits and burdens of achieving their common interests, BEE does not 
have principles that guide participants to act in a fair and equitable manner. 
Rawls appraises the value of the individual within the consensus; BEE tends to 
appraise select groups of individuals.  
In BEE, there are no provisions to manage the inequalities that are invariably 
associated with a capitalist system of allocation yet Rawls’s Difference Principle 
makes the least advantaged the focus of the choices being made – the worst 
possible outcome of the choices being made should be to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged. In the redistribution of wealth, BEE only considers the 
poorest of the poor if it helps consummate the deal. The choices being made are 
not guided by what the least advantaged might desire. 
While there is no doubt that BEE is in the distributive justice trajectory, some of 
the choices made in the implementation of this policy seem to point at a 
commutative justice orientation. Critics think the ownership and control basis for 
BEE create bourgeoisies with a reparations mindset who are perpetual 
dependents. The primacy of the individual as capable of carrying out her 
programme of life is emphasised in Rawls’s principles. Given his strong 
egalitarian values, the group that is a nonentity from a moral standpoint is 
emphasised in BEE policy. 
In Rawls’s principles, every individual counts and individuals can be held morally 
responsible. In BEE the distribution is allocated along race lines in terms of 
entitlement – yet the beneficiaries are real individuals. The policy of BEE 
conflates the individual with the group, which is problematic from an egalitarian 
point of view.  
Rawls suggest that, because of the universal applicability of his principles of 
justice, they could be used to assess the direction of any social change. These 
principles are not met by BEE as currently constructed. 
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Section 6: Conclusion 
The argumentation above shows that BEE does not measures up against 
Rawls’s theory of distributive justice. The requisite underlying principles of 
distributive justice require equality, liberty, equality of opportunity and inequality 
that is to the greatest advantage of the worst off class.  
BEE does not contain the discussion of the rules that will govern the scheme 
where every member participates on an equitable basis. The moral basis of these 
stakeholder relationships is a matter for empirical enquiry. 
BEE does not have the individual as the focal point of its principles, thus it 
conflates the group with the individual. Beneficiaries are very few; however, their 
benefit is derived on a representative scale that reflects population sizes. 
The accentuated inequalities that emanate from the implementation of BEE are 
not geared towards the benefit of the worst off class. Since BEE is politically 
induced it has spawned out what seems to be ‘parasitical bourgeoisies’ as 
opposed to ‘productive bourgeoisies’ who participate in BEE with no intention of 
changing the intra- and inter-firm relational patterns. These are bourgeoisies who 
have treated empowerment as an end in itself, and not as a means to effect a 
more equitable society. 
The equality of opportunity and access to office is limited to those who have 
historical and current links with the ruling party. While BEE emanates from a 
constitutional democracy it does not bear the egalitarian characteristics required 
by Rawls’ distributive theory. 
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